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Abstract: Thinking about policy mixes is at the forefront of current research work in the policy
sciences and raises many significant questions with respect to policy tools and instruments,
processes of policy formulation, and the evolution of tool choices over time. Not least among
these is how to assess the potential  for  multiple policy tools to achieve policy goals in an
efficient and effective way. Previous conceptual work on policy mixes has highlighted evaluative
criteria  such  as  "consistency"  (the  ability  of  multiple  policy  tools  to  reinforce  rather  than
undermine each other in the pursuit of individual policy goals), "coherence" (or the ability of
multiple policy goals to co-exist with each other in a logical fashion), and "congruence" (or the
ability  of  multiple  goals  and  instruments  to  work  together  in  a  uni-directional  or  mutually
supportive fashion) as important design principles and measures of optimality in policy mixes.
And previous empirical work on the evolution of existing policy mixes has highlighted how these
three criteria are often lacking in mixes which have evolved over time as well as those which
have otherwise been consciously designed. This article revisits this early design work in order to
more  clearly  assess  the  reasons  why many  existing  policy  mixes  are  sub-optimal  and  the
consequences this  has for thinking about policy formulation processes and the practices of
policy design.
Keywords: planning; policy design; policy instruments; policy layering; policy mixes; policy
portfolios
1. Introduction: Policy Portfolios and Policy 
Design
Policy design is an activity which unfolds in the policy
process as policy actors deliberate and interact over
the construction  of  both the means or  mechanisms
through which policy goals are given effect and the
goals of policy themselves. It is "the effort to more or less
© 2013 by the authors;  licensee Librello,  Switzerland. This  open access article was published
under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
systematically develop efficient and effective policies
through  the  application  of  knowledge  about  policy
means  gained from experience,  and  reason,  to  the
development and adoption of courses of action that
are likely to succeed in attaining their desired goals or
aims"  [1-3].  But  public  policies  are  comprised  of
complex arrangements of policy goals and policy means
which can be packaged in a more, or a less, systematic
fashion. Why this is the case and how thinking about
policy design can be advanced and made more sys-
tematic is the subject of this article.
Like 'planning', policy design theory has its roots in
the 'rational' tradition of policy studies, one aimed at
improving policy outcomes through the application of
policy-relevant knowledge to the crafting of alternat-
ive  possible  courses  of  action  intended  to  address
specific policy problems [4-12]. But it extends beyond
this to the consideration of the practices, frames of
understanding, and lesson-drawing abilities of  policy
formulators  or  "designers"  in  adapting  design  prin-
ciples to the particular contexts that call for policy re-
sponses [2,13].
Assessing policy designs and the extent to which
policy-making can be considered to embody an inten-
tional design logic begins with the recognition that in
many  circumstances,  policy  decisions  will  be  more
highly contingent and 'irrational' than in others [14].
That is, there is no doubt that in many cases policy-
making is driven by situational logics and opportunism
rather than careful deliberation and assessment [15-19].
This high level of contingency has led some critics
and  observers  to  suggest  that  policies  cannot  be
'designed' at all, at least in the sense that a house or
a piece of furniture can be the product of conscious
and systematic design fashioned and put into place by
one or more 'designers'. But those who have written
about  policy  design  disagree  with  this  assessment.
Recognizing  the  dialectic  existing  between  principle
and context they distinguish the formulation process
from the actual design of a policy itself [20]. In much
the same way as the development of an architectural
plan  can  be  distinguished  from  its  engineering  or
construction manifestations, optimal policy designs in
this sense can be thought of in a 'meta' or abstract
sense as 'ideal types', that is, as configurations of ele-
ments which can reasonably be expected, if adopted
with due attention given to specific contextual settings
and needs, to have a higher probability of delivering a
specific outcome than some other configuration. Whether
or not this potential is actually realized in practice is
another matter and the subject of separate, although
clearly related, investigation and inquiry.
This  article  explores  this  meta-orientation  to  the
study of policy designs. Bracketing the actual process
of policy formulation which may or may not provide
auspicious conditions for a 'design orientation', it first
revisits several 'first principles' for policy portfolio design
found in the policy design literature and addresses the
nature  of  the  evaluative  criteria  used  to  distinguish
'good' from 'poor' design. Returning to the ground of
actual  policy-making,  it  then  moves  on  to  consider
issues such as the 'degrees of freedom' or room to
manouevre which designers have in developing and
implementing their designs and the ideas of 'maximiz-
ing complementarity' and 'goodness of fit' with existing
governance  arrangements  with  which  contemporary
design theory is grappling. Finally it develops the notion
that  two distinct  and very different types of  design
processes  have  been  incorrectly  juxtaposed  in  the
literature—"policy patching" and "policy packaging." It
suggests the former is more likely to be found in prac-
tice than the latter and should be the subject of further
research in this area of policy and design studies. The
article shows how the early design literature has been
refined to incorporate some of the shortcomings iden-
tified by subsequent empirical research, and now ap-
proaches  formulation  and  design  issues  fully  taking
into account restrictions on the abilities of designers
to accomplish their designs in practice while offering
realistic guidance on how these may be overcome.
2. Policy Design, Policy Portfolios and Ex-Ante 
Assessment
Policy makers typically consider several policy altern-
atives, some of which, or parts of which, may ultimately
be  implemented  in  the  attempt  to  achieve  desired
outcomes. These are alternative options for how gov-
ernment  action  can  be  brought  to  bear  to  resolve
some identified problem or attain some goal and their
articulation and consideration forms the basis of pro-
cesses of policy formulation.
It is important to note that in this conception policy
design is thus both a 'verb'—in the sense of character-
izing one manner in which a policy formulation process
can unfold in creating a policy configuration sensitive
to the constraints of time and place—and also a 'noun'—
in the sense of being an actual product or artifact that
can be compared to others [21].
Policy design as a verb involves some process of
coordinating disparate actors working in a given spatio-
temporal context towards agreement on the content of
designs-as-noun. These processes of policy design or
formulation are interesting and complex and subjects
of inquiry in their own right but, as noted above, can
be separated, at least in the abstract, from the 'design-
as-noun' itself. Again, to use an architectural metaphor,
this is true in much the same way as craftsmanship
and skill in construction are significant factors involved
in  realizing a building vision but  can be  considered
separately from the vision itself; which can be assessed
not only against its concrete realization but also against
aesthetic and other criteria for assessing 'good' from
'poor' designs [21-24].
But what is it that is 'designed' in policy design? In
all but the very simplest contexts, policy alternatives
are options for government action comprised of different
sets  of  policy  means—that  is  policy  tools  and  their
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calibrations—bundled together into packages of meas-
ures which are expected by their designers to be cap-
able of attaining specific kinds of policy outcomes [25-28].
"Policy designs" in this sense refer to how specific types
of policy tools or instruments are bundled or combined
in a principled manner into policy 'portfolios' or 'mixes'
in an effort to attain policy goals.
Analyzing policy design in the context of such policy
portfolios raises a series of questions about how ex-
actly  the superiority  of  the  design of  one mix over
another can be assessed ex-ante. A design perspective
in general assumes that not all designs are equal nor
is one design just as good as any other, and a subject
of much interest to students of policy designs, there-
fore, is the nature of the evaluative criteria which can
be used to identify "better" or more 'intelligent' designs
and distinguish them from 'poor'  designs,  and from
'non-designs'.
Various design principles have been articulated at
various points in the history of studies of policy formu-
lation and policy tool  choice with this end in mind.
And the merits and demerits of some of these efforts
are  set  out  below.  As  shall  be  discussed,  rules  or
maxims have been proposed both about how many
tools and goals there should be in a bundle and about
how tools should be combined in order to stand the
best chance of attaining these goals [29]. The former
is a subject which received some attention as early as
the 1950s and resulted in the development of several
principles of policy design which emphasized aesthetics
of  simplicity  and  elegance.  The  latter  issue  received
some attention in the 1970s and 1980s as scholars em-
phasized a need to avoid unreflexive preferences for
the use of highly coercive tools on the part of govern-
ments  and  instead  urged  sequenced  designs  which
began slowly with the use of the least 'interventionist'
tools possible before 'moving up' to the use of more
coercive designs only if  and so far  as less  coercive
ones proved unable to accomplish stated goals.
While these areas were the subjects of most early
thinking about policy mixes, more recent design thinking
has begun to address a second series of questions re-
lated to the larger issues of how and to what extent
tools must not only be related logically or evidentially
to each other but must also must match their policy
environments in order to be both practically feasible
as well as theoretically elegant. That is, designs have
come to be seen as involving the need to go beyond
just a logical or theoretical match of policy elements
to goals but also must involve a match between the
social construction and ecological adaptation of policy
[30], or between 'principle' and 'context' [31]. This is
in much the same way as architectural  designs can
either ignore or reflect and incorporate their geo-physical
settings with most designers advocating the latter course
as generating more pleasing and effective results.
This more recent thinking about the nature of policy
mixes and their design has raised several new issues
for policy design thinking which add an additional layer
of complexity to earlier analyses and principles. Older
concepts such as consistency', 'coherence', and 'con-
gruence' which set out the goals towards which complex
designs should aspire have now been joined by other
considerations such as those concerning what level or
'degrees of freedom' designers have in moving towards
new designs or building on old ones. Such considera-
tions often promote 'policy experiments' or trial runs
and pilot projects which may or may not be scaled up
into full-blown programmes depending on their out-
comes as a means to determine policy fit to practice
[32,33] and have led to suggestions for more resilient
or adaptable designs which retain adequate 'flexibility'
or adaptive elements to allow them to be adjusted to
changing circumstances once in place [33,34].
These  studies  take  very  seriously  the  need  to
'match' design to both spatial and temporal contexts
that were lacking in earlier studies. To this end they
have developed a new set of maxims to replace those
earlier ones often found faulty or limited when applied
to  policy-making  practice.  These  include  injunctions
such as those urging flexibility cited above as well as
those urging policy formulators to "maximize comple-
mentary effects"  in  their  choice of  tools  and goals.
They  also  include  precepts  related  to  the  need  to
better  match policy designs and policy designing or
formulation activities, such as considerations of how
to assess the goodness of fit between policy elements
and their environments in the effort to match policy
designs with governance contexts. These existing and
new design principles  and maxims are discussed in
more detail below.
3. Older Design Maxims and Their Problems
Contemporary thinking about policy formulation and
policy designing is firmly rooted in an older literature
on policy design which over the course of the 1950s
to 1990s developed several maxims or heuristics ex-
pected  to  be  used  to  head  off  common  errors  or
sources of failure in policy-making. These included the
promotion of parsimonious tool use in policy mixes,
the injunction to begin with less coercive tools  and
only move towards increased coercion of policy targets
as  necessary,  and  the  adoption  of  the  above-men-
tioned notions of coherence, consistency and congru-
ence as criteria for assessing the level of optimality of
the arrangement of elements in a policy mix. Although
a good start,  as  noted below only limited empirical
evidence supported the accuracy and utility of these
principles,  which  tended  to  underestimate  the  diffi-
culties involved in formulating and implementing com-
plex policy mixes. As these faults were recognized, new
efforts  to  think  about  more  complex  policy  designs
have led to a new generation of design thinking in this
area and the articulation of a new set of principles
and practices expected to result in superior designs;
that  is,  ones more likely  to  reach their  targets  and
achieve their goals [35-38].
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3.1. Parsimonious Tool Use
The first and oldest maxim in the policy design literat-
ure  is  the  injunction  to  observe  parsimony  in  tool
selection. An oft-cited rule in this area, for example,
was first put forward by Jan Tinbergen in 1952 [29],
to the effect that the "optimal ratio of the number of
tools to targets" in a policy should be 1:1 [39]. That
is, that the number of policy tools in any mix should
roughly match the number of goals or objectives set
for a policy.
This may appear to be a reasonable rule-of-thumb,
for which Tinbergen provided some logical justification
in his discussion of the information and administrative
costs  associated with the employment of  redundant
tools  in  the area of  economic policy-making. In his
work, for example, Tinbergen analyzed what he termed
the 'normal' case in which one goal was matched with
one target in a simple situation in which one instru-
ment could fully address its task and accomplish the
goal set out for it. Most observers, however, including
Tinbergen, were well aware that in practice combina-
tions of tools are typically used to address single and
especially multiple policy goals, not a single instrument
addressing a single goal.  In such circumstances,  as
Tinbergen [29] noted "it goes without saying that com-
plicated systems of economic policy (for example) will
almost invariably be a mixture of instruments" (p. 71).
As  a result  he himself  argued "a priori  there is  no
guarantee that the number of targets (goals) always
equals the number of instruments" (p. 37).
Such admonitions and caveats about design complex-
ity, unfortunately, were usually neglected in studies os-
tensibly based on Tinbergen's work, with many erstwhile
designers attempting to force complex situations into
the more simple mould required for Tinbergen's rule
to apply [39]. More contemporary thinking about policy
design,  however,  begins  not  with  single  instrument
choices  at  specific  moments  in  time  de  novo,  but
rather with considerations of designing mixes of tools
which specifically take into account the spatio-tempor-
al complexities missing in earlier design studies [25,26].
Thus they move well 'beyond the Tinbergen Rule' in
the effort to inform modern design contexts and prac-
tice in a meaningful way.
3.2. Moving Up the Scale of Coercion in Sequential 
Instrument Choices
A second principle of policy design found in the older
literature on the subject was not only the injunction to
be parsimonious in the number of instruments chosen
at a specific point in time in order to attain a goal, but
also to be sparing in their use dynamically or sequen-
tially over time. In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, for
example, Bruce Doern, Richard Phidd, Seymour Wilson
and others published a series of articles and mono-
graphs that placed policy instruments on a single con-
tinuum based on the 'degree of government coercion'
each instrument choice entailed [30-44]. They argued
that choices of tools, or  policy designs, should only
'move up the spectrum' of coercion as needed so that
the 'proper' sequencing of tool types in a policy mix
would be from minimum levels  of  coercion towards
maximum ones  [45].  Assuming  that  all  instruments
were more or less technically "substitutable" or could
perform any task—although not necessarily as easily
or at the same cost—it was argued that in a liberal
democratic society, governments, often for both ideo-
logical  and pragmatic reasons, would prefer to, and
should,  use  the  least  coercive  instruments available
and would only employ more coercive ones as far as
was necessary in  order to overcome societal  resist-
ance to attaining their goals. As Doern and Wilson ([45],
p. 339) put it:
"(...) politicians have a strong tendency to respond
to policy issues, (any issue) by moving successively
from the least coercive governing instrument to the
most coercive. Thus they tend to respond first in
the least coercive fashion by creating a study, or by
creating a new or re-organized unit of government,
or merely by uttering a broad statement of intent.
The next least coercive governing instrument would
be to use a distributive spending approach in which
the resources could be handed out to constituencies
in such a way that the least attention is given as to
which taxpayers' pockets the resources are being
drawn from. At the more coercive end of the con-
tinuum of governing instruments would be a larger
redistributive programme, in which resources would
be more visibly extracted from the more advant-
aged classes and redistributed to the less advantaged
classes. Also at the more coercive end of the gov-
erning  continuum  would  be  direct  regulation  in
which the sanctions or threat of sanctions would
have to be directly applied."
This  rationale  for  instrument  choice  clearly  took
policy context into account in making design decisions
and  moved  design  discussions  such  as  Tinbergen's
forward in that respect. That is, Doern and his col-
leagues  work  was  based on an appreciation  of  the
ideological preferences of liberal-democratic societies
for  limited  state  activity  and  on  the  difficulties  this
posed for governments in the exercise of their prefer-
ences due to the relative "strength" or ability of societal
actors  to  resist  government  efforts  to  shape  their
behaviour.
This formulation has many advantages as a design
principle. It is not uni-dimensional, although it might
appear so on first reading, because it does take into
account several political and contextual variables and
assumes instrument choices are multi-level, with finer
calibrations of instruments emerging after initial broad
selections of  tools  have been made [46].  Preferring
"self-regulation", for example, governments might first
attempt to influence overall target group performance
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through exhortation  and education efforts  and then
add instruments to this mix only as required in order
to compel recalcitrant societal actors to abide by their
wishes, eventually culminating, if necessary, in regula-
tion or the public provision of goods and services.
This maxim was based on both observations of the
actual design practices followed by many governments
which were used to develop and inform a set of prin-
ciples informing 'proper' or appropriate overall tool pref-
erences.  However,  as  Woodside [47] argued,  it  was
lacking in several ways. As he put it:
"Experience suggest that governments do not always
seek to avoid coercive solutions, but indeed, may at
times seem to revel in taking a hard line from the
start. While there are undoubtedly many reasons for
these heavy handed responses, surely some of the
most  important  ones  include  the  constituency  or
group at which the policy is aimed, the circumstances
in which the problem has appeared, and the nature
of the problem involved" ([47], p. 786).
Hence  although  suggestive,  this  second  design
principle also needed nuance and revision. These and
other  similar  concerns  led  to  further  efforts  in  the
1990s to deal with the complexities of policy design,
especially in the context of mixes or bundles of tools.
3.3. Coherence, Consistency and Congruence as 
Measures of Design Integration and Criteria of 
Superior Design
These early efforts from the 1970s and 1980s to artic-
ulate fundamental policy design principles were over-
taken  in  the  1990s  by  work  which  focused  on  the
need to  articulate  a  set  of  general  principles  which
would more clearly inform the selection of the various
parts of a mix or portfolio, bracketing for a moment
the issue of formulation processes and policy outcomes.
Here it was noted that policies are composed of several
elements: distinguishing between abstract or theoretical/
conceptual goals, specific programme content or object-
ives, and operational settings or calibrations [48-50]—for
example, as set out in Table 1. The central criteria which
the design literature developed for dealing with how
these multiple parts of a policy should be related was
the notion of 'integration' or the idea that goals and
means within mixes should not work at cross-purposes
but mutually reinforce each other [51-53].
That  is,  moving  beyond  Tinbergen's  rule,  it  was
argued  that  some  correspondence  across  elements
was required if  policy goals were to be successfully
matched with policy means [49,51]. And it was argued
that  a  relatively  small  number  of  criteria  could  be
identified to help assess the extent to which existing
or future mix elements were integrated [54].
Previous work on policy design had identified one
such evaluative criteria in the notion of "consistency"
or the ability of multiple policy tools to reinforce rather
than undermine each other  in  the  pursuit  of  policy
goals. A second such criteria related to goals rather
than  means.  Here  the  idea  of  "coherence"  or  the
ability  of multiple policy goals to co-exist  with each
other and with instrument norms in a logical fashion
was developed.  Finally  the  idea  of  "congruence"  or
the ability of goals and instruments to work together
in  a  uni-directional  or  mutually  supportive  fashion
rounded out these three integrative dimensions pro-
posed for a superior policy design [55].
Table 1. Components of a policy mix.
Policy Content
High Level Abstraction Programme Level
Operationalization
Specific On-the-Ground
Measures
Policy 
Focus
Policy 
Ends or 
Aims
Goals
What General Types of
Ideas Govern Policy 
Development? (e.g. 
environmental 
protection, economic 
development)
Objectives
What Does Policy 
Formally Aim to Address? 
(e.g. saving wilderness or
species habitat,  
increasing harvesting 
levels to create 
processing jobs)
Settings
What are the Specific On-the-
ground Requirements  of 
Policy (e.g. considerations 
about the optimal size of 
designated stream-bed 
riparian zones, or sustainable 
levels of harvesting)
Policy 
Means or
Tools
Instrument Logic
What General Norms 
Guide Implementation
Preferences? (e.g. 
preferences for the 
use of coercive 
instruments, or moral 
suasion)
Mechanisms
What Specific Types of 
Instruments are Utilized? 
(e.g. the use of different 
tools such as tax 
incentives, or public 
enterprises)
Calibrations
What are the Specific Ways in 
Which the Instrument is used?
(e.g. designations of higher 
levels of subsidies, the use of 
mandatory vs. voluntary 
regulatory guidelines or 
standards)
Source: modified from [50].
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The development of such criteria was a significant
advance over the earlier works mentioned above and
moved policy design thinking well beyond other frame-
works developed around the same time which purpor-
ted only to develop a series of 'hints' for policy-makers
to follow in promoting better designs [56,57].
However, while clear enough in theory, these works
raised to the forefront the need to, like Doern and his
colleagues had done, re-integrate thinking about policy
'design-as-noun' with 'design-as-verb' or policy formu-
lation [58,59]. This was because empirical work on the
evolution  of  long-term policies  or  'institutions'  high-
lighted how these three criteria were often only weakly
represented in existing mixes, especially those which
have evolved over a long period of time [60,61]. That
is,  empirical  research into policy designs in practice
revealed  considerable  gaps  between  the  coherency,
consistency  and  congruence  of  actual  policy  mixes
compared to their theoretical specification and high-
lighted the need to consider the temporal evolution of
tool portfolios, much as Doern and his colleagues had
done several decades earlier [62].
4. Modern Principles of Policy Design: 
Complementary Effects, Goodness of Fit and 
Degrees of Freedom
Recent design thinking has built on this basis in earlier
studies and has underlined the importance of consid-
ering both the full range of policy instruments when
designing a mix—rather than assuming that a choice
must be made between only a few alternatives such
as  regulation  versus  market  tools  [63]—as  well  as
ensuring that a proposed mix is compatible with exist-
ing governance arrangements [64]. Towards this end,
several  new principles have emerged in the current
design literature. These include "maximizing comple-
mentary effects" and "goodness of it", or attempting
to ensure a good fit  between policies elements and
between those elements and their governance context.
4.1. Maximizing Complementary Effects
A major issue and insight driving contemporary design
studies  concerns  the  fact  that  not  all  of  the  tools
potentially involved and invoked in a policy mix are
inherently complementary [65-67] in  the sense that
they may evoke contradictory responses from policy
targets [68-73] and thus fail to achieve their goals. At
the  same time,  of  course,  some combinations  may
also  be  more  virtuous  in  the  sense  of  providing  a
mutually reinforcing or supplementing arrangement [74].
Similarly, some other arrangements may be unneces-
sarily duplicative while in others some level of redund-
ancy may be advantageous in ensuring that a stated
goal will be achieved [75,76].
Grabosky [66] and others worked on these issues
throughout the mid-to-late 1990s, noting that some
tools necessarily counteract each other—for example,
using command and control regulation while also at-
tempting voluntary compliance—and thus those com-
binations should be avoided in 'smart' policy designs.
Hou and Brewer [74] similarly worked on the other
side of this design coin, noting that other tools com-
plemented or supplemented each other—for example,
using  command  and  control  regulation  to  prevent
certain  behaviour  deemed  undesirable  and  financial
incentives to promote more desired activities at the
same time—and thus those combinations should be
encouraged.
A key  principle  of  current  policy  design thinking,
therefore, is to try to maximize supplementary effects
while  minimizing  counterproductive  ones.  "Smarter"
designs are thus said to involve the conscious creation
of policy packages which take these precepts into ac-
count in their formulation or packaging [64,65,77,78].
4.2. Goodness of Fit: The Need for Designs to Match 
Governance Mode and Policy
Contemporary design thinking also highlights the need
for designs to respond not only to such general theor-
etical design principles but also to the particular, context-
dependent features of the policy sector involved [26]. In
this sense, "goodness of fit" between the policy mix and
its governance context is a concern and can be seen
to occur at several different levels.
That is, at one level design choices emerge from
and must generally be congruent with the governance
modes  or  styles  practiced  in  particular  jurisdictions
and sectors. This is because different orientations to-
wards state activity  involved in policy mixes require
specific capabilities on the part of state and societal
actors  which  may  only  be  forthcoming  if  the  mix
matches the governance context. Policy designs, it is
argued, thus must take into account the actual resources
available to a governmental or non-governmental actor
in carrying out their appointed roles in policy imple-
mentation [79]. Thus, for example, planning and 'steering'
involve direct co-ordination of key actors by govern-
ments,  requiring  a  high  level  of  government  policy
capacity  to  identify  and  utilize  specific  policy  tools
capable of successful moving policy targets in a required
direction [80,81].
Work  on 'policy  styles'  [82-84]  in  the  1980s  and
1990s identified a number of common patterns and
motifs in governance arrangements in specific sectors
and  jurisdictions  which  contemporary  design  theory
argues designs in different jurisdictions should reflect
[26,79,85]. While many permutations and combinations
of possible governance arrangements exist, recent policy
and administrative studies have focused on four basic
or 'ideal' types found in many jurisdictions and sectors
in liberal democratic states. These are the  legal, cor-
porate,  market  and  network  governance  forms  (see
Table 2). Government actions through legal and net-
work  governance,  for  example,  can  change  many
aspects of policy behaviour but do so indirectly through
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the alteration of the relationships existing between dif-
ferent kinds of social actors [86,87]. This is unlike cor-
porate and market governance which involves more
overt state direction. Each mode has a different focus,
form of  control,  aim  and  preferred  service  delivery
mechanism  and  procedural  policy  orientation  which
policy designs should incorporate and approximate if
they are to be feasible.
This  relationship  between  governance  style  or
context and the policy instruments and goals contained
in a policy mix is a significant one for studies of policy
design.  Since  the  exact  processes  by  which  policy
decisions  are  taken vary  greatly  by  jurisdiction  and
sector and reflect differences between and within dif-
ferent forms of government—from military regimes to
liberal democracies—as well as the particular configura-
tion of issues, actors and problems found in particular
areas or sectors of activity—such as health, education,
energy and transportation, social policy and many others
[88,89]—the existence of a relatively small number of
overarching governance modes allows for the matching
of design and context in an easily understandable and
applicable fashion.
Table 2. Modes of governance.
Mode of 
Governance
Central Focus of 
Governance 
Activity
Form of State 
Control of 
Governance 
Relationships
Overall 
Governance 
Aim
Prime Service 
Delivery 
Mechanism
Key Procedural 
Tool for Policy 
Implementation
Legal 
Governance
Legality—
Promotion of law 
and order in social 
relationships
Legislation, Law 
and Rules
Legitimacy—
Voluntary 
Compliance 
Rights—Property,
Civil, Human
Courts and 
Litigation
Corporate
Governance
Management—of 
Major Organized 
Social Actors
Plans Controlled and 
Balanced Rates of
Socio-economic 
Development
Targets—
Operational 
Objectives
Specialized and 
Privileged 
Advisory 
Committees
Market 
Governance
Competition—
Promotion of Small
and Medium sized 
Enterprises
Contracts and 
Regulations
Resource/Cost 
Efficiency and 
Control
Prices—
Controlling for 
Externalities, 
Supply and 
Demand
Regulatory 
Boards, Tribunals 
and Commissions
Network 
Governance
Relationships—
Promotion of Inter-
actor 
organizational 
Activity
Collaboration Co-Optation of 
Dissent and Self-
Organization of 
Social Actors
Networks of 
Governmental, 
and Non-
Governmental 
Organizations
Subsides and 
Expenditures on 
Network 
Brokerage 
Activities
Source: modified from [90,91].
4.3. Degrees of Freedom
A third key concept which has emerged in contemporary
design thinking around this same issue is that of 'de-
grees of freedom' or the consideration of the relative
ease or difficulty with which policy-makers can alter
the status quo. That is, if any combination of tools was
possible  in  any  circumstance  then  decision-makers
could be thought of as having unlimited 'degrees of
freedom' in their design choices. Empirical studies of
large scale institutional changes, however, have noted
this kind of freedom in combining design elements is
quite rare. For example, this can occur in situations of
what Thelen [92] terms 'replacement' or 'exhaustion'
when older tool elements have been swept aside or
abandoned and a new mix is designed or adopted de
novo. As Thelen noted, however, most existing mixes or
portfolios have rather emerged from a gradual histor-
ical process in which a policy mix has slowly built up
over time through processes of incremental change or
successive reformulation. As Christensen et al. [93] have
argued, a key  design issue is thus the leeway policy
designers have in developing new designs given the
pre-existence of historical arrangements of policy ele-
ments. This has added a siginificant temporal dimension
to  policy  design  studies  which  early  generations  of
thinking either ignored or downplayed.
That is, in addition to the requirements of "goodness
of fit" with prevailing governance modes there are also
constraints imposed by existing trajectories of policy de-
velopment. As Christensen et al. [93] note, "these factors
place constraints on and create opportunities for pur-
poseful  choice,  deliberate  instrumental  actions  and
intentional efforts taken by political and administrative
leaders to launch administrative reforms through ad-
ministrative design" (p. 158).
How much room for manouevre designers have to
be creative [94] or, to put it another way, to what degree
they are 'context bound' in thus time and space [26]
is a subject of much current interest in contemporary
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design studies. From the historical neo-institutionalist
literature cited above it is well understood that com-
plex policy mixes, like institutions, can emerge through
several distinct processes or historical trajectories [92,
95-97]. These trajectories—'layering', 'drift', and 'conver-
sion'—differ  from  'replacement'  and  'exhaustion'  in
terms of the challenges that they raise for each gen-
eration  of  designers  attempting  to  integrate  policy
elements in effective, complementary, or 'smart' mixes
with coherent goals, consistent means, and congruency
of goals and instruments. Layering is a process whereby
new elements are simply added to an existing regime
without abandoning previous ones, typically leading to
both incoherence amongst the goals and inconsistency
with  respect  to  the  instruments  and  settings  used.
Drift occurs when the elements of a policy mix are
deliberately maintained while the policy environment
changes. The impact of the policy mix is thus likely to
change and this is the result that the designer wants
to achieve [98].  Conversion involves holding most of
the elements of the policy mix constant while redeploy-
ing the mix to serve new goals [99]. While consistency
may remain largely intact, conversion poses significant
risks of incongruence between the old instrument ele-
ments and the new goals that have been introduced.
Replacement is thus not the only, or even necessar-
ily the only desirable, historical context for policy design;
it simply imposes the smallest number of constraints
on successful design. Except in the case of completely
new policy areas or old ones facing the kind of total
overhaul envisaged in periods of policy punctuations,
however, policy designers, are typically faced with a situ-
ation in which an already existing policy mix is already in
place and cannot be easily discarded [100,101].
These existing arrangements have commonly emerged
or evolved over relatively long periods of time through
rounds of previous decisions, and even if they had a
clear logic and plan at the outset they may no longer
do so [102]. Designers' freedom is thus hemmed in on
two sides.  First,  existing mixes often have accumu-
lated varying degrees of political support from those
who benefit from them, ruling out complete replacement
[103-105].  In such cases  where key instruments in
the mix are defended by powerful  "instrument con-
stituencies", layering can be an appropriate response
since these  interests  may have no objection  to  the
addition of new instruments provided only that "their"
instrument is not touched. Conversion, on the other
hand, may be indicated where these instrument con-
stituencies can be persuaded that their favoured instru-
ments may actually be strengthened by the addition
of new goals that bring in new political support for the
existing mix. Drift can also be the favourite strategy of
political  interests  who  are  not  strong  enough  to
destroy a policy mix whose goals they dislike but, by
blocking necessary change, may succeed in reducing
or  even transforming its  impact  to  something more
palatable to them [106].
5. Policy Packaging and Policy Patching as 
Design Methods
This  last  point  raises  another  area  of  interest  in
current design studies, that of the basic mode or style
of  policy-making  best  suited  to  realizing  policy
designs.  An  important  insight  in  this  regard  is  that
designers  can recognize  and manipulate  the  relation-
ships involved in processes such as layering, drift and
conversion, just as they can those related to replace-
ment and exhaustion [107].
Hacker, for example,  has argued that layering, in
many ways the simplest way of changing a policy mix,
is  a  process  that  can  ultimately  induce  conversion.
This  is  because,  as  new instruments  and goals  are
added into the mix without abandoning the previous
ones,  new  possibilities  for  relating  goals  to
instruments open up [108]. Drift, on the other hand,
may be deliberately used to engineer a crisis in which
replacement becomes a real possibility as the impact
of a policy mix diverges ever more obviously from that
intended by its original  designers,  shedding political
support along the way. Layering may have a similar
outcome while employing the opposite political mech-
anism when a new instrument, originally a minor part
of  the  policy  mix,  gradually  assumes  prominence,
perhaps as the result of setting or calibration changes,
and attracts defectors from other instrument constitu-
encies [109]. In such situations designers can attempt
to patch or restructure existing policy elements rather
than propose alternatives  de novo  in a new package
of measures [59,110].
Although there is a strong tradition in the design
literature to restrict discussions of design to situations
characterized  by  processes  of  replacement  and  ex-
haustion there is ample existing evidence showing that
many existing policy  regimes or mixes have  instead
developed through processes of policy layering, or re-
peated bouts  of  policy conversion or  policy drift,  in
which new tools and objectives have often been piled
on  top  of  older  ones,  creating  a  palimpsest-like
mixture of inconsistent and incoherent policy elements
[111].  And sweeping it  all  away and starting again
with custom made policy designs capable of meeting
contemporary policy challenges may seem to be the
obvious solution. Policy packaging of this kind, which
deliberately seeks to exploit  synergistic  relationships
between  multiple  policy  instruments,  was  definitely
the explicit or implied preference in most earlier efforts
to promote enhanced policy integration and coherence
in designs across different policy domains [51-53].
However, recognizing that layering, conversion and
drift can also be 'intentionally' designed—much in the
same way as  software designers issue 'patches'  for
their operating systems and programmes in order to
correct flaws or allow them to adapt to changing circum-
stances—is a critical insight into design processes with
which  contemporary  design  studies  is  beginning  to
grapple. Distinguishing between policy packaging and
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policy patching as two methods of attaining the same
goal—the  heightened  coherence,  consistency  and
congruence of complementary policy elements coupled
with a better fit between tools and their context—is a
needed step towards moving beyond older principles
of parsimony and the inexorable use of less coercive
tools  towards  enhancing  the  ability  of  policy  for-
mulators to deal with policy problems which demand
complex governmental responses [112].
6. Conclusion: Policy Design and the Feasibility 
of Policy Alternatives
The purpose and expectations of policy design efforts
have always been clear [113,114]. Design is an activity
conducted by a number of policy actors in the hope of
improving policy-making and policy outcomes through
the accurate anticipation of the consequences of gov-
ernment actions and the articulation of specific courses
of action to be followed. This is to be accomplished by
improving assessments of both the theoretical effect-
iveness as well as the feasibility of policy alternatives
[115-118]. 
Each  "policy"  however  is  a  complex  'regime'  or
arrangement of ends and means-related goals, object-
ives,  instruments  and  calibrations  which  exist  in  a
specific  governance  setting  and  which  change  over
time. Central  concerns in  the design of  policies  are
thus related to answering questions about how these
mixes are constructed, which methods yield superior
results and what is the likely result of their (re)design.
Understanding these aspects of policy formulation and
design and synthesizing knowledge about them into a
small  number  of  precepts  which  policy  formulators
can  follow  in  their  work  has  always  been  at  the
forefront of policy design work.
However  these  considerations  must take  into  ac-
count the fact that 'policies' are typically 'bundles' or
'portfolios' of policy tools arranged in policy mixes and
that  such bundles are typically  the outcome of  dis-
tinctive processes of policy change, in which elements
are  added and  subtracted  from the  mix  over  time.
Early work on policy design did not always take this to
heart  and  clarifying  the  principles  enunciated  and
articulated by early policy design proponents and ap-
plying them to policy mixes, and distinguishing between
intentional and unintentional process of policy change
in the development of such bundles has been a central
feature of contemporary policy design study and efforts
to  move policy design processes and understanding
forward.
While policy designs can and should be considered
in the abstract, understanding how policy change pro-
cesses create and modify mixes is critical to evaluat-
ing the chance of success for any particular policy mix
to attain its goals once put into practice.  Adding the
notion of policy 'patching' to considerations of intelligent
design, for example, better connects design consider-
ations to practice than do many earlier discussion firmly
centered in the 'planning' orientation. These often rely
upon  ideas  about  the  ease  or  need  for  wholesale
policy replacement which do not exist in practice. 
Contemporary design discussions centered on the
articulation of design principles such as "goodness of
fit" in policy formulation, governance and steering, and
the 'degrees of freedom' which formulators or design-
ers have in carrying out their work both over space
and over time help to complement and advance earlier
notions such as parsimony and the gradual ratcheting
of coercion, and the need for coherence, consistency
and congruence in designs which were a major fea-
ture of earlier eras of thinking about design issues. 
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